Introduction
Recent research in international taxation has focused on the optimal design of foreign income tax rules 1 . This research has been prompted by the huge growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the consequent rise in profits earned abroad. For example, Huizinga and Nicodème (2005) investigate how host countries tax the increasing share of profits earned by the foreign-owned sector. The home country must also decide how to tax income earned abroad. Home countries typically choose between exempting foreign income from taxation or taxing foreign income at the home country rate and granting foreign tax credits or deductions for foreign taxes paid. The choice of foreign income tax rules is important. Recent studies have found that foreign income tax credit systems result in significant welfare losses for countries (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2001) . Clausing (2004) has shown that tax credit countries collect more revenue than countries that adopt a tax exemption system, while, Bénassy-Quéré et al (2005) demonstrate how tax credit systems can serve as a brake on tax competition. In this paper we investigate how foreign income tax rules can influence the financial structure of FDI.
Empirical research has provided ample evidence on the sensitivity of aggregate FDI to corporate tax rates (see Ederveen and de Mooij, 2003) . In addition, some recent studies have compared the effects of different foreign income tax rules on the size of bilateral aggregate FDI flows (see Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2004) . Corporate taxation, however, is not only important in explaining the geographic dispersion of foreign owned assets, but is also a potentially important determinant of the financial structure of FDI.
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The financial structure of FDI can be decomposed into a mix of equity, retained earnings and loans. Few countries report a complete disaggregation of FDI positions and currently cross-country comparisons are only possible by comparing equity and reinvested earnings together against intra-company loans 2 . Table 1 illustrates the financial structure of FDI in European countries over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The average structure of European FDI indicates that just under 75 per cent is funded by equity and re-invested earnings, the remaining is financed by intra-company loans. However, the overall average masks significant cross-country heterogeneity in the components of FDI. For example, 53 per cent of German FDI is composed of intra-company loans, whilst in Ireland equity and reinvested earnings account for over 97 per cent of total FDI. The heterogeneous financial structure of FDI across countries may be explained by differences in corporate tax rates.
Specifically, because interest payments on loans can shield profits from corporate taxation one might expect FDI in high tax countries to be composed predominantly of intra-company loans. Hence, the contrast between Germany and Ireland may be explained by high corporate tax rates in Germany compared to the low tax rates in Ireland. Clearly there is less incentive to use interest tax shields when corporate tax rates are low.
In addition to the corporate tax rate, the rules governing the taxation of foreign income may be a significant determinant of the financial structure of FDI. FDI originating from countries operating foreign income tax-exemption rules are likely to feature a higher proportion of debt finance, as profits shielded from taxation abroad will not be subject to additional taxation upon repatriation. In contrast, the financial structure 6 of FDI originating from countries that adopt foreign income tax credit rules may be less sensitive to corporate tax rates. This is because credit systems tax worldwide income, granting credits only for foreign taxes paid. Foreign income repatriated home is subject to repatriation taxes equal to the difference between the home country tax liability and the amount of foreign taxes paid. Therefore, income that has been shielded from taxation abroad will be liable for higher repatriation taxes. Since this postpones any net tax saving, the result is that there may be no deterministic relationship between host country corporate tax rates and the financial structure of FDI from tax credit countries 3 .
In this paper we use financial data at the subsidiary level to examine the financial structure of foreign-owned assets. The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on how corporate tax rates and corporate tax rules affect the financial composition of FDI in European countries. In this respect, we make two main contributions. Firstly, we investigate whether the financial structure of FDI is sensitive to different corporate tax rates. This tests the results of the extant literature in an international context and checks the robustness of these results using a variety of tax rate measures. Secondly, we provide new evidence on how foreign income tax rules may affect the tax-minimising behaviour of multinationals. By identifying the country of origin of each subsidiary, we can estimate the importance of foreign income tax rules in determining the financial structure of FDI originating from contrasting foreign income tax systems. This study is the first to directly 7 estimate the impact of contrasting foreign income tax rules on multinational firm-level data.
Our results confirm recent research findings that corporate taxation is an important determinant of the financial structure of FDI. The econometric evidence suggests that 10 per cent higher taxes lead to a 3.4 per cent higher proportion of debt financed FDI. Our results prove robust to a variety of corporate tax rate measures and cross-country validation. However, this result is dependent on the international tax rules adopted by the home country. As expected, when the country of origin adopts foreign income tax credit rules it appears to eliminate the incentive for its FDI enterprises to use debt-financed FDI to shield foreign income. In contrast, the estimates for FDI originating from countries operating tax exemption rules support the hypothesis that multinationals can effectively shield profits from corporate taxation by using debt financed FDI. This provides evidence on the effectiveness of foreign income tax rules in securing corporate tax revenue for credit countries and indicates that FDI from tax-exemption countries can be optimally financed to reduce foreign tax liabilities in high tax countries, relieving pressure on the so called 'race to the bottom' in statutory corporate tax rates 4 .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the extant literature on the how corporate taxation affects FDI and the limited evidence on how corporate taxation affects the financial structure of FDI. Section 3 describes the AMADEUS dataset that we use in this study. In section 4 we present the estimation 8 methodology and results that use a number of firm level controls and an interaction term to capture the effect of foreign income tax rules. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The literature
A recent meta-analysis surveying the literature on how FDI responds to corporate taxation estimated an absolute mean elasticity of FDI to corporate tax rates of 3.3 per cent (Ederveen and de Mooij, 2003) . This suggests that a 1 per cent increase in host country corporate tax rates leads to a 3.3 per cent decrease in FDI. There is, however, no consensus on how foreign income tax rules affect FDI. Slemrod (1990) compares the sensitivity of aggregate FDI flows distinguishing between credit and exemption countries; however, his results reveal no significant differences. Hines (1996) , using a similar methodology to Slemrod (1990) OECD countries from 1984-2000. They find that FDI flows respond asymmetrically to tax rate differentials between countries and that the effect of credit and exemption rules is important. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) , using U.S. multinational data, find that the location of affiliate assets is particularly sensitive to corporate tax rates within Europe, and they argue that this is indirect evidence on the effect of tax exemption systems common among European countries.
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The aggregate statistics in Table 1 suggest that corporate tax rates may be important in determining the pattern of intra-company loans. Intra-company loans may be particularly sensitive to corporate tax rates as tax legislation allows the interest expense on loans to be deductible from profits before they are subject to corporate taxation. In the case of the multinational subsidiary, intra-company loans can be used to shield income from taxation in high corporate tax jurisdictions. Gropp and Kostial (2000) is the first study that attempts to examine the effect of corporate taxation on the components of FDI, and also integrate foreign income tax rules into the analysis. The data they use are highly aggregated, allowing them to distinguish only between debt and equity investment and re-invested earnings together. Furthermore, due to data availability problems they are limited to a study of FDI outflows only. They postulate that foreign affiliates ultimately owned in tax credit countries have a larger incentive to reinvest their earnings abroad (rather than repatriate them) relative to an affiliate from a tax exemption country. The results of their analysis reveal that the composition of FDI outflows exhibit different patterns for credit and exemption countries. Specifically, they find that affiliates from tax exemption countries invest more abroad, but are less likely to use re-invested earnings to fund this investment and much more likely to use a combination of debt and new equity 5 . They find that the composition of inward FDI flows is insensitive to corporate tax rates, and depends only on the foreign income tax rules adopted by the host country.
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It is not possible to control for many features of individual FDI decisions using aggregate data. At the subsidiary level we expect that higher host country corporate tax rates should be reflected in higher subsidiary leverage ratios 6 . There are, however, potential costs to increased subsidiary leverage in high tax rate countries. Singh and Hodder (2000) note that while borrowing can increase interest tax shields, it also increases costs such as the risk of loosing tax shields, financial distress as well as agency costs. Transaction costs may also be important in setting up such tax planning strategies, with economies of scale resulting in larger subsidiaries facing much lower costs of arranging an optimal leverage ratio. Furthermore, subsidiaries with large fixed asset investments may require the use of increased debt finance to fund investment irrespective of host country tax rates. Therefore, controlling for these subsidiary characteristics, will allow a more robust estimation of the effects of host country corporate taxation on the financial structure of subsidiary-level FDI. Recent survey evidence appears to corroborate these theoretical insights: nearly 80 per cent of multinational firms surveyed consider tax as a factor when they decide between new equity and debt when financing foreign
The problematic nature of aggregate FDI data coupled with the need to control for subsidiary level characteristics has meant that recent studies have used affiliate level data to investigate the relationship between corporate taxation and the financial structure of FDI. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) use U.S. data sourced from the Internal Revenue
Service for 1996 to investigate the sensitivity of affiliate debt-asset ratios to host country corporate tax rates. Using data on just under 6,000 U.S. affiliates, they find that 10 per cent higher host country tax rates lead to 3.9 per cent higher debt-asset ratios. Jog and Tang (2001) 1982, 1989 and 1994 , to investigate the sensitivity of affiliate debt-asset ratios to host country corporate tax rates. They find that 10 per cent higher host country tax rates lead to 2.8 per cent higher debt-asset ratios. In the first contribution to the non-U.S.
literature, Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) are unable to find evidence that debt-asset ratios are sensitive to corporate tax rates. They use data from the Deutsche Bundesbank between the home country of the affiliate and the German tax rate. They estimate the effect of the tax rate difference on the use of intra-company loans by almost 10,000
foreign subsidiaries over the period 1996-2001. They are, however, unable to uncover any statistically significant relationship.
Until now, the literature has not considered the effect of foreign income tax rules on the benefits of altering the financial structure of FDI in order to shield foreign income from corporate taxation. Under a credit system, a parent company that structures investment in a subsidiary to shield foreign income from host country taxation will incur higher repatriation taxes when transferred home. As a result, the parent company from the credit country will be indifferent between financing the foreign subsidiary through reinvested profits, debt and equity finance. However, if the parent company is located in an exemption country, income shielded from taxation abroad can be repatriated home without attracting additional taxes. The multinational firm resident in a foreign income tax-exemption country can realise the tax savings it has made by optimally financing the foreign investment. In reality, thin capitalization rules will limit the extent to which subsidiaries from exemption countries can shield income using intra-company loans; and, the use of deferral and the limited foreign tax credits may give some advantage to using debt finance for subsidiaries from credit countries. In this paper, we examine use data at the subsidiary-level to estimate the importance of foreign income tax rules in determining the relationship between the financial structure of foreign subsidiary investments and host country corporate tax rates.
Empirical Analysis

The data
We use the AMADEUS (Analyse Major Databases from European Sources) dataset comprising financial and ownership data on incorporated companies operating in Europe 8 . Bureau Van Dyke compiles the AMADEUS database from company accounts filed under legal obligations in European countries. The financial data are supplemented using information from company reports and direct communications with the individual 8 For recent studies using AMADEUS see Huizinga and Nicodème (2005) and 13 companies. In total, AMADEUS contains financial and ownership data on over 1.5 million companies, an estimated 98 per cent coverage of all companies incorporated in Europe. The observations are standardised (both in currency and definition) across all countries so that items in the profit and loss and balance sheet are directly comparable for every entity.
From the AMADEUS database we identify foreign subsidiaries using the standard OECD definition 9 . There is a total of 314, 516 foreign subsidiaries identified in AMADEUS. From these we select only those which file unconsolidated accounts so that the subsidiary's operations can be separately identified from the multinational firm as a whole. For our analysis, the subsidiary must also have a complete record of the financial data over the period 2000-2003 10 . Applying this rule, the final sample size is just under 8,500 foreign subsidiaries observed annually over four years across 16 European countries.
It is important that this dataset is representative of multinational activity in the respective countries. To check this we cross-validated the dataset with aggregate statistics from the OECD Measuring Globalisation database 11 . The OECD database has aggregate country-level statistics on the number of foreign subsidiaries and the distribution of 14 employment in these subsidiaries across 9 industry categories. We aggregated our AMADEUS data subset on number of subsidiaries and employment into the same industry categories and compared them with the OECD data using a rank correlation coefficient. For the majority of countries this returned a correlation coefficient of greater than 0.9, and in most cases it exceeded 0.99. The high correlation coefficient indicates that our sample is representative of multinational activity in our sample of European countries. In addition to the subsidiary level dataset we also require country level data on corporate tax rates and the foreign income tax rules (credit or exemption). For corporate tax rates we use the data provided by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) . This dataset comprises a range of corporate tax measures and offers a number of advantages in checking the robustness of our analysis. Whilst statutory tax rates are perhaps the most familiar they may not capture the incentives present in tax systems 12 . Two alternative approaches attempt to provide the effective corporate tax rate applicable in each country.
The most common effective tax rate measure found in this literature is that described in Desai, Foley and Hines (2001) . This measure calculates the tax paid by each firm as a percentage of its pre-tax profits. The median tax rate of firms in each country is then derived from the firm-level tax rates, and this is used as an estimate of the actual corporate tax rate in that jurisdiction. By calculating the tax rate using the actual data on taxes paid by subsidiaries, this tax rate measure attempts to capture some of the 12 Variations in the definition of taxable items and the scope of the tax base will not be captured by the statutory tax rate 15 incentives present in the tax code of the particular country. Because these tax rates are calculated using actual tax and profit data, they are referred to as ex-post tax rates.
An alternative approach is to calculate the effective tax rate on a hypothetical investment project. This tax rate measure captures the incentives present in the tax code of the particular country in which the investment is being made, by modeling the specific features of the tax code in that jurisdiction. These ex ante tax rates were pioneered by King and Fullerton (1983) 
Specification
In order to obtain estimates of the effect of corporate taxation on the financial structure of FDI, we estimate an OLS panel data model of the form:
The dependent variable (Y it ) is the leverage ratio of the individual subsidiary (i) in each year (t). It is defined as the ratio of short and long-term debt to total assets at the subsidiary, thus capturing the proportion of the total investment financed by debt. Using this measure has the additional advantage of allowing us to directly compare our results with previous studies. The most important explanatory variable is the corporate tax rate (TAX jt ) for each country (j) in each year (t).
The theoretical literature suggests that we use a number of controls to account for subsidiary heterogeneity. We control for the size of the subsidiary measured as the log of operating revenue (SIZE it ) to capture the effect of economies of scale that may allow some subsidiaries to adapt financial structure more easily to corporate tax rates. We also control for the profitability of the subsidiary (PROFIT it ) which is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets.
Less profitable subsidiaries may prefer lower leverage ratios to avoid the costs of financial distress and the risk of losing tax shields. Finally, subsidiaries with large investments in fixed assets may require substantial financing necessitating the use of increased debt finance. This effect is controlled for by including the proportion of subsidiary tangible fixed assets to total assets (TANG it ).
We use C m to represent a vector of fixed effects. Our estimates include fixed effects for the parent company, the industry of the affiliate and the year. By employing a parent company fixed effect, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity between multinational firms subsidiary leverage policies. For example, some multinational groups may have specific preferences over financial structure that we cannot observe; however, by including the parent company fixed effect we can control for this unobserved heterogeneity when we estimate the sensitivity of the financial structure of FDI to corporate taxation. The industry fixed effect controls for inter-industry differences in leverage ratios, and the year effect controls for year-specific effects. v gti is an independent error term.
Contrasting foreign income tax rules can lead to differences in the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to corporate taxation. To capture this we use an interaction term (CREDIT) that is set equal to 1 if the subsidiary is from a foreign income tax credit country, and zero otherwise.
Y it = β 1 TAX jt + β 2 (CREDIT*TAX jt ) + β 3 SIZE it + β 4 TANG it + β 5 PROFIT it + c m + v it (2) This allows us to estimate separately the effects of corporate tax rates on the financial structure of FDI from countries that exempt foreign income compared to those which operate a foreign income tax credit system. Our intuition suggests that the coefficient on the interaction term will be negative; a negative coefficient would indicate that the sensitivity of leverage ratios of the subset of subsidiaries ultimately owned in tax credit countries will be less sensitive to taxation compared to the complete sample. In the next section we estimate equations 1 and 2, and test the robustness of our estimates using a variety for robustness checks.
Results
We first estimate how the financial structure of FDI responds to corporate tax rates, and then test whether foreign income tax rules influence this relationship. Figure 1 provides some suggestive evidence on how corporate tax rates affect the financial structure of FDI at an aggregate level. The figure plots the average leverage of foreign subsidiaries against the country-level effective tax rate. The regression line suggests that higher corporate tax rates are correlated with a higher proportion of debt financed FDI. The benefit of using micro-level data is that we can control for various subsidiary characteristics and provide more robust results.
In Table 2 we present regression results using subsidiary level data. The dependent variable is the leverage ratio of each subsidiary, measured as the ratio of subsidiary long and short-term debt to total subsidiary assets. Column (1) presents the results of regressing the subsidiary leverage ratio against the ex-post corporate tax rate faced by each subsidiary in each year. The estimated coefficient on the corporate tax rate variables is positive and significant, indicating that a 10 per cent increase in corporate taxation leads to a 3.5 per cent increase in subsidiary leverage ratios. The magnitude of tax-rate effect is in line with the current literature discussed earlier. In Column (2) we control for subsidiary characteristics discussed earlier. The results in Column (2) indicate that the relationship between the financial structure of FDI and corporate tax rates is robust to controlling for individual subsidiary characteristics.
One difficulty of interpreting the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) is that they do not control for unobservable non-tax determinants of subsidiary leverage. For example, subsidiaries owned by the same parent company may all share a common unobserved characteristic that is not controlled for in the previous OLS estimates. Therefore, in
Column (3) we report estimates using Equation 1 which includes a full set of industry, year and parent company fixed effects. The estimate of the tax sensitivity in Column (3) is not affected by the unobserved effects relating to the industry of the subsidiary, the particular year of the observation, or the characteristics pertaining to the particular multinational parent. While the addition of these fixed effects reduces the sample size as the parent company is not always identifiable, the tax rate coefficient remains highly significant in all cases. Table 3 presents results using a variety of tax rate measures that allows us to test the robustness of the corporate tax effect. In Column (1) we use the statutory tax rate as the explanatory variable, including the control variables and the fixed effects used earlier.
The coefficient estimate indicates that while the leverage ratio is slightly less sensitive to the statutory tax rate, the relationship remains highly significant. Column (2) reports estimates using the ex-post tax rate measure, replicating the results presented in Table 2 .
In Column (3) we use the ex-ante average effective tax rates calculated by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) . The ex-ante tax rate coefficient is comparable in magnitude to the ex-post tax rate coefficient presented in Column (2), and importantly the relationship remains highly significant. These results reveal that subsidiary leverage responds positively and significantly to corporate tax rates, irrespective of how they are measured.
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Finally we test whether the nature of foreign income tax rules affect the relationship between corporate taxation and the financial structure of FDI at the subsidiary level. In Table 4 we estimate Equation 2 which uses an interaction variable to capture how the effect of the corporate tax rate varies according to tax-rules adopted by the country of ultimate owner. The earlier discussion suggests that foreign income tax credit rules will decrease the sensitivity of leverage ratios to corporate tax rates, and our results support this hypothesis. Columns (1) to (3) estimate how the effect of corporate tax rates vary according to the tax rules adopted by each country for the three different tax rate measures. In each case, the interaction variable has a negative co-efficient indicating that foreign income tax credit rules reduce the sensitivity of leverage ratios to corporate tax rates. For example, in Column (3) the effect of foreign income tax credit rules reduces the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to statutory corporate tax rates to only 0.07. The magnitude and significance of the interaction variable coefficient suggests that the tax rules adopted by a country can potentially eliminate the advantage of using debtfinanced FDI 14 . These results reveal that the interaction of corporate tax rules and corporate tax rates is an important determinant of the financial structure of FDI.
Conclusion
The increasing share of profits that are earned abroad has raised interest in the design of foreign income tax rules. By locating operations in low tax rate countries, multinational 14 In Appendix A.1 we present the results of a cross-validation exercise that sequentially drops one country in turn from the sample and re-estimates the model. The results of this robustness exercise are unambiguous: the coefficient on corporate tax changes only marginally and it remains significant at the 1 per cent level in each scenario. In addition, the negative effect of foreign income tax credit rules is consistent across the sample. Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
